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Abstract
If an economy runs a current account (CA) deficit and finances it
via a corresponding net inflow of equity capital (belonging to foreign
direct investment (FDI) or to portfolio investment) the external debt
(ED) of the country does not change, i.e.: the CA deficit does not add
to ED. This is no paradox and simply comes from the definition of CA
deficit and external debt. Nonetheless, the implication of this is rather
relevant since it points to different degrees of sustainability of CA
deficits according to the way they are financed and to the composition
of the CA itself.
By the evaluation of the determinants of interest rates spreads of
a country vis à vis US lending rates we assess the sustainability of
CA deficits and we find that the extent of FDI net inflows (proxy of
equity capital) allow emerging economies to sustain imbalances which
are larger with respect to the case in which the CA deficit is financed
by inflows of other more liquid assets. In other words the differential
treatment of equity capital as a way of financing the CA, but not
contributing to to the ED of a country, is no fiction and affects the
solvency assessment of a country. This is a first result of a larger
research on the effects of the composition of the CA on the solvency
of an economy.
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1 Introduction
History and literature tell alternatively happy end stories and tragedies brought
about by current account (CA) imbalances and external debt of countries.
Australia, Canada, Norway have run for decades CA deficits without incur-
ring in any external crisis. South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand during the
years between 1997 and 1998 and other countries involved in systemic crisis
of the 1990s and 2000s paid a high price for their CA deficits, despite the
robustness of their economies, the low levels of imbalances and the relatively
short period of time during which external disequilibria persisted.
Several interpretations have been put forward to account for the divergent
destinies of countries exhibiting similar patterns of CA deficits. Most of them
point to the short term financial exposition of countries (and their banks) in
recent systemic episodes and to other structural features such as the weakness
of financial institutions or unsustainable growth rates.
Recent literature (Lane, 2003, 2005; Lane and Milesi - Ferretti, 2005a,
2005b) has began to investigate more deeply the sustainability of CA im-
balances. The focus has become the composition of CA and the way CA
imbalances is financed. As a consequence the analysis had been devoted to
the section of the CA that concerns capital incomes (interest and dividends).
Here, signals of the sustainability of the external debt of an economy can be
found, since the composition of the “financial side” of the CA can provide
hints as to the returns on gross foreign assets and liabilities of a country.
This looks like a promising route to investigate the degree of riskiness of a
country from the point of view of its international financial position. Our
aim is to proceed along this path concentrating on the role of equity capital
flows and, in particular, FDI due to their weight and relevance for emerging
countries.
Equity capital and equity securities receive a particular treatment in the
accounting of external debt (ED) of an economy and this makes the effect of
FDI, which is largely made by equity capital, on the solvency of a country
rather special. Flows of FDI and, in general, equities, are recorded in the
financial account (FA) of the balance of payments of a country. But they do
not contribute to the ED of an economy (IMF, 2000; 2003, chapter 2).
To be more precise and simple consider the following example.
Suppose the balance of payments (BOP) of country Afrinda shows a CA
deficit of 10 $ and an FA surplus of 10 $. This surplus is entirely due to
a net equity inflow. Then the BOP of Afrinda is in equilibrium. Neither
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the exchange rate (ER) should move, in the case of flexible ER, nor foreign
exchange reserve (FER) should vary, in the case of fixed ER. What happens
to the ED of Afrinda? Nothing, since it stays constant and does not change
as a result of the net inflow of 10 $ of equities, because they do not contribute
to the ED (IMF, 1993; 2000; 2003).
On the contrary, suppose Afrinda had an inflow of 10$ due to the purchase
by foreigners of treasury Bonds issued by Afrinda. The effect of this on the
BOP would have been the same as before. Yet, the ED of Afrinda should
worsen by 10$, while with equities it would not change.
All this is due to the fact that equities inflows do not affect the ED of
an economy. What is the rationale of this seemingly inexplicable artifact?
The reason is statistical taxonomy. But this comes from the very nature of
equities and in particular those belonging to FDI and it is no artifact. As
a matter of fact FDI may bring about and finance with foreign funds the
acquisition by a non-resident of a chunk of real capital endowment which is
not much liquid and not immediately tradable (Rossini and Zanghieri, 2003).
As we have seen in the above example, in an extreme case, the equilibrium
of the BOP with recurrent CA deficits, could be secured by covering entirely
the CA deficit selling equities to foreigners. In this case a country may
run CA deficits for quite prolonged periods if inflows of equity capital are
sufficient to finance it, as they do not impinge upon its ED.
The drawback of all this is that equity flows go into two categories of
the FA of the balance of payments. The first is FDI, which is made up of
two items: flows of “Equity Capital and Reinvested Earnings” and “Other
Capital.” The second is Portfolio Investment, whose components are “Eq-
uity securities” and “Debt Securities”. The problem is that the accounting
distinction between “Equity Capital and Reinvested Earnings” and “Other
Capital” is not so clear-cut and may give rise to some statistical misrecording.
The particular nature of FDI and the particular treatment of a large
portion of it for the definition of the ED of an economy will make the assess-
ment of sustainability quite dependent upon the weight of FDI in the FA of
a country.
Given all above considerations, the purpose of this paper is that of evalu-
ating the relevance of FDI for the sustainability of CA deficits and the effect
of the weight of FDI on the variables that signal the degree of stress of the
external position of a country. A country with a large net inflow of FDI will
be fairly free to run prolonged CA imbalances without worrying about its
ED since a large chunk of FDI does not influence ED.
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The paper is made up of three sections and an epilogue. In the next
section we go through some discussion of solvency and liquidity. In the third
we provide an extension of solvency formulas taking into account balance
of payments issues and the role of FDI. In the fourth section we dwell on
econometric testing, while conclusions are drawn in the epilogue.
2 Sustainability - solvency and liquidity
In most of the literature (Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1996; Beim and Calomiris,
2001; Lane, 2004; Lane and Milesi - Ferretti, 2005a, 2005b) the concepts of
solvency - sustainability and illiquidity of ED are kept separated. A coun-
try is illiquid and liable to face a liquidity crisis if it not able to pay back
immediately most short term obligations without incurring in any financial
distress. This could touch the interest rate producing a large increase in
spreads with respect to corresponding interest rates of leading countries. Or
it may thoroughly upset financial and monetary markets and the exchange
rate (ER).
Liquidity crisis are sometimes associated to solvency crisis but they do
not necessarily coincide with them. However, in the last episodes of systemic
crisis, like that in Asia during the period 1997-1998, liquidity was the culprit.
But solvency was generally not an actual issue except, perhaps, for Indonesia.
In other words most countries hit by the contagious crisis showed an ED that
was fairly sustainable. In 1998 many financial and foreign exchange traders
bet on the devaluation of the Chinese yuan without considering the sound ED
of the People’s Republic. Two years later the same traders would complain
and press the US government to start a long and tedious campaign for a yuan
appreciation, which is still under way. Agents were (excessively) worried by
the relative composition of the assets vis à vis the liabilities of some economies
involved, as the countries seemed to have too liquid liabilities and less liquid
assets.
Even though solvency and liquidity crisis may partially overlap, they
rarely coincide. The equity paradox mentioned in the introduction provides
new hindsight into this question and lends itself to further considerations
when evaluating the solvency of a country.
5
With large net inflow of equities, and in particular FDI, a country may
be quite solvent but at the same time its degree of illiquidity may be quite
worrying or, at least, variable. While a country with low equity flows may be
liquid but quite liable to be insolvent. Our view is that a solvent country is
much safer than a liquid country and that financial and monetary variables
should reflect a less myopic stance.
3 A textbook reassessment of solvency
As far as the solvency issue is concerned we may reassess it by simple exten-
sion of usual approaches (Obsfeld and Rogoff, 1996) that aim at the deter-
mination of ratios that signal distress of an economy ED.
It is quite widely accepted that a reliable indicator of the solvency of a
country is a stable ratio of ED over the GDP (or GNP). Agents are quite
comfortable with stable ratios since they provide some cushion for risk and
variability. We embrace this view even though it may not be entirely justified
on theoretical grounds.
We wish to see whether a proper accounting of equity flows - proxied by
FDI - may alter the usual ratio adopted in the literature and in policy eval-
uation. To this aim we take into account the definition of the ED mentioned
in the introduction and adopted by international standards of the IMF (IMF,
1993; 2000; 2003) and the World Bank (World Bank, 2005).
The analysis requires the consideration of the intertemporal budget con-
straint (IBC) of an open economy. We adopt a very simple framework (Ob-
stfeld and Rogoff, 1996) and assume that the expenditure is made up, for the
sake of simplicity, only of consumption (Cs) and investment (Is) flows.
Then the IBC, over an infinite horizon, is given by:
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t(Cs + Is) =
= (1 + r)Bt + (1− r)Ft +
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t [Ys + (Fs+1 − Fs)(1− r)] (1)
where r stands for the common return on foreign assets (and liabilities)1.
1This assumes away transaction costs which are crucial to give rise to asymmetries
between countries with CA surpluses vis à vis those with deficits (Obstfeld and Rogoff,
2000).
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Assets and liabilities are of two kinds: Bt that represents the net stock at
time t of foreign financial assets (short and long term) that contribute to the
definition of the ED of a country, while Ft describe the net stock of equities
hosted by a country2. Strictly speaking inflows of equities are a liability. But
a special liability, since it does not contribute to the ED of an economy, while
it can be used to finance a CA deficit.
We further assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the common return on
all assets and liabilities is entirely repatriated each year.
In the above definition of the IBC we take into account of this special
feature whereby the stock of equities does not contribute to the ED of a
country, which comes from an accounting rule which has been internationally
codified (IMF, 1993; 2000; 2003; World Bank, 2005). This norm is based on
the fact that an equity is a real asset and it remains the property of a stranger
in a foreign country. For instance an FDI does not contain any timely defined
obligation to pay back any holder of any obligation, unlike what occurs with
debt securities3. Equity and most FDI flows can be used to finance the CA
deficit of a country and are recorded in the FA of the BOP, but they do
not enter the definition of the ED. In other words equities do not affect the
sustainability assessment of the ED of a country, while their flows finance
CA imbalances.
The left hand side of (1) defines the present value (PV) of the aggregate
expenditure of a country.
On the right hand side we find the description of the resources available.
In the first part we show the stock of available net foreign assets at t, given by
(1 + r)Bt. In the second part, we add the net stock of equities Ft multiplied
by (1 − r), since we assume that dividends are repatriated. This stock is a
sort of “asset” since it allows a country to pay for the import of foreign good
by “selling capital.” Using a colorful example, equity is to be classified like
the sale of an existing peach tree to foreigners. If the tree gives rise to profits
and these are not repatriated they do not increase the ED. The second part
of the left hand side of (1) shows the PV of future production (Ys) and net
2For all assets and liabilities there is a valuation question. Assets could be valued either
at the acquisition price (or book value) or at their current value. Problems arise in both
cases since the current price is not exactly the value that the owner of the asset can obtain
when selling if he has a large amount of the asset or if other agents will follow him.
3For the particular nature of FDI and its influence of the saving available in an economy,
see also Rossini and Zanghieri (2003) in a different perspective within the "Feldstein -
Horioka puzzle" literature.
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equity flows (Fs+1 − Fs).
Then we can write:
−(1 + r)Bt − (1− r)Ft =
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t [Ys − Cs − Is + (Fs+1 − Fs)(1− r)] .
(2)
Using the standard notation (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996) we define the
Trade Balance flow of each period as
TBs = Ys − Cs − Is (3)
and the Trade Balance of Real resources that can be exchanged with foreign-
ers as:
TRs = TBs + (Fs+1 − Fs)(1− r). (4)
Then we can write
−(Bt + Ft)− r(Bt − Ft) =
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−tTRs, (5)
which is a stock - flow relationship.
We follow textbook assumptions and we take into account the fact that
financial markets are very keen on a stable relationship between the ED of a
country and its GDP (or GNP). This stability is associated to lower country
risk. Then we assume that GNP grows at a constant rate g. For a steady
ED/GNP ratio Bt must grow at the same speed g.
Thanks to the above considerations and using the standard CA definition,
a stable ED / GNP ratio can be secured if we have:
Bs+1 −Bs = gBs = rBs + TRs = (6)
= rBs + TBs + (Fs+1 − Fs)(1− r)
or
TBs = −(r − g)Bs − (Fs+1 − Fs)(1− r). (7)
If we divide both sides by YS we get:
TBs
Ys
=
−(r − g)Bs − (Fs+1 − Fs)(1− r)
Ys
. (8)
The above equation changes the usual definition of the burden of a country
with an ED. Here the novelty is that the amount of trade surpluses that a
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country needs to transfer in steady state to foreigners is reduced by equity
inflows. This alters quite substantially the sustainability assessment of a
country ED. We shall see empirically, in the next section, whether equities,
proxied by FDI, actually makes a difference. A country should be considered
more solvent the higher are equity flows entering into the financing of CA
deficits. We shall see how this can be reflected in the values of variables
measuring the sustainability of an ED.
Two simple subcases can be added to extend the above formula (8) of the
ED burden.
• Dividends are not repatriated but transformed into new equities:
TBD
s
Ys
=
−(r − g)Bs − (Fs+1 − Fs)(1 + r)
Ys
. (9)
We easily see that
TBDs
Ys
≤
TBs
Ys
.
• The equity net stock grows at the same rate of GNP and no repatriation
of dividends takes place:
TBGs
Ys
=
−(r − g)Bs − gFs(1− r)
Ys
= (10)
=
−r(Bs − gFs) + g(Bs − Fs)
Ys
.
which is larger than (8) if gFs ≤ Fs+1 − Fs.
As it can be seen, the effect of equity is definitely not just one of making
the capital flows less volatile, as they are less liquid, but that of making an
ED more sustainable. Equity reduces the extent of trade surpluses that an
economy has to run to arrange the repayment of its ED. Coeteris paribus, CA
deficits of the same size will have different effects on country risk according
to the share of equity in their financing.
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4 The empirical evaluation
After some theoretical accounting analysis we go through the econometric
tests of the relevance of equity proxied by FDI for the sustainability of the
ED of a country.
Literature has provided many measures and signals of distress of ED of
countries (Beim and Calomiris, 2001; Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfen-
nig, 2003; Ghosh and Ghosh, 2002). One of the most widely used and ac-
cepted is the spread between the interest rates in the leading financial market,
i.e. the US and those of the area under scrutiny. Countries with ailing CAs
over a long time span tend to show, almost in all circumstances, higher inter-
est rates. Even if there is no risk of sovereign default on external obligations,
the sheer existence of international transaction costs affect the buying and
selling price of saving on the international markets, i.e. the spread in in-
terest rates, making CA deficits quite costly, mainly for emerging countries
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000).
Therefore, our stance is that the signal of ED distress of an economy is
given by the spread (SPR) between its interest rates and that of the US. To
measure it we use the lending rate, although we are aware that it is only a
proxy of long term interest rates which we should use instead, but we do not
have, for many countries, in a comparable way.
This signal of stress, SPR, is determined by the variables that depict
the hindrances a country is encountering as far as its external accounts and
its external imagine are concerned. We wish to see to what extent SPR is
affected by net FDI inflows, or in other words, if the magnitude of net FDI
inflows is able to influence the level of the signaling variable. The thesis we
are going to test is that SPR - that is, the signal - is going to decrease if a
country has larger net inflows of FDI, as the previous section suggests.
Nonetheless several other variables are supposed to determine SPR. We
list them, even though our emphasis remains on the role of FDI.
Therefore, the crucial explanatory variable is the net FDI inflow over the
GDP i.e.: NFDI / GDPN. Both the numerator and the denominator are in
nominal terms. This is the variable that should have a temperating effect on
SPR: the higher is this variable the lower is SPR.
The second explanatory variable is the relative inflation rate of the coun-
try vis à vis the US, i.e.: INFL. We introduce INFL since we should compare
real interest rates spreads and inserting, among the explanatory variables
of interest rates spread, INFL is equivalent to compare real interest rates
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spreads.
As the third variable, we use a monetary indicator of growth of money
supply (M2) called GRMON since we expect that a larger money supply
increases the spread.
As the fourth variable we introduce the ratio of Foreign Exchange Re-
serves over the ED, i.e.: TRES/EXDB. The higher this ratio the lower should
be SPR as we expect that the country is less liable to incur in any illiquidity
crisis, since the larger is the amount of reserves it holds, vis à vis the external
debt, the higher is the ability to pay back monetary and short term financial
obligations.
As a fifth variable we consider the terms of trade, TOT. They are an
indicator of the competitiveness of an economy and, therefore, of the ability
to pay back foreign debt.
The sixth variable we use is a measure of soundness of real external ac-
counts. Named CAR, it is given by the CA balance relatively to GDP, a
prime indicator of a country economic imbalance on its foreign relationships.
The seventh variable we add is a dummy, DLATAM, to separate the
economies of Latin America from countries of other areas. In that region
specific sustainability criteria are adopted both by the countries themselves
and by international investors.
As the eighth variable we add lagged real GDP in Logs so as to capture the
ability to grow of a country and therefore the capacity to produce sufficient
resources to pay back, via trade surpluses, its international obligations.
Other explanatory variables are presented in the specific econometric ex-
ercise in which they are used.
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4.1 TEST 1
In the first test we conduct we use a static panel based on annual data over
the period 1992-2003 for a group of emerging countries represented by Asian
(and Middle East) and South American emerging economies.
The group is made up of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, India, Sri
Lanka, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, Egypt, Jor-
dan.
The results of the econometric tests are summarized in Table 1 below.
12
Table 1
Method Pooled EGLS
Observations 238
Dependent var.: SPR
coefficient Std. error t-stat. prob.
Explan. var.s
INFL .41 .20 2.07 .04
NFDI / GDPN -1.07 .31 -3.45 .00
GRMON .34 .11 3.25 .00
TRES / EXDB -8.77 3.24 -2.70 .01
DLog(TOT−1) -16.15 7.59 -2.12 .03
CAR−1 -.39 .20 -1.91 .06
DLATAM 14.63 2.36 6.20 .00
DLog(GDPR−1) -6.84 37.69 -.18 .86
R-squared 0.425 Mean dep. var. 20.63
Adj. R-squared 0.39 S.D. dep. var. 22.35
S.E.of regression 17.40 Akaike info crit. 8.59
Sum squared resid. 69305.41 Schwarz crit. 8.72
Log Likelihood -1012.91 D.B. stat. .42
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COMMENTS
From Table 1 we can draw some inferences as to the role of FDI and other
variables in the explanation of SPR.
FDI seems to play the expected role and be able to reduce the spread
of lending rates - the dependent variable - which is the signal of stress in
the ED of a country. The weight and significance of the coefficient of the
explanatory variable containing FDI confirms our theoretical prior that FDI
helps a country to make its ED lighter.
The expected sign can be found also in the estimated coefficients of other
variables. This is the case of the degree of international liquidity of a country.
The more liquid an economy is in terms of foreign exchange reserves, the lower
will be SPR.
Inflation adds, of course, to the spread since it provides the nominal wedge
between the interest rates of countries. Moreover, a looser monetary policy
increases SPR as the coefficient of GRMON indicates.
Significant and relevant is the regional dummy whose high positive coeffi-
cient proves that Latin America is perceived as more risky and is, therefore,
suffering a higher spread than countries belonging to other regions.
The sign of the delayed terms of trade (TOT) is at first sight puzzling.
However, the association between a lower price of exports relatively to im-
ports and a higher spread is simply the result of exchange rates variations
which are mirrored in the TOT of a country. An exchange rate devalua-
tion makes for lower export prices and higher import prices and it is usually
associated to larger interest rates spreads.
Finally, it appears that the worse is the CA the higher is the spread a
country faces. A result which confirms textbook priors.
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4.2 TEST 2
In the second test reported in Table 2 below we turn to an enlarged sample
of countries. The previous group is supplemented by economies belonging
to Eastern Europe. Some of them now belong to the enlarged EU as from
May 2004, but our investigation is not affected by that since the time span of
our data is 1992-2003. The new entries in our sample are Bulgaria, Russia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.
In this test we change the method of estimation introducing fixed effects.
The different sample and estimation method lead to a fresh specification
whereby we have changed some explanatory variables. Data availability has
also played a role. FDI is now utilized relatively to the CA balance, both mea-
sured in local currency (NFDI / CAL). We also add the variable DLog(XN)
which stands for rate of growth of the value of exports at current prices.
Finally we use a constant (C) as the estimation is carried out with fixed
effects.
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Table 2
Method Pooled EGLS Fixed effects
Observations 358
Dep.var.: SPR
coefficient Std. error t-stat prob.
Explan. var.s
INFL .21 .09 2.18 .03
NFDI / CAL -.04 .01 -2.19 .03
GRMON .19 .05 4.01 .00
DLog (XN) -7.25 2.18 -3.33 .00
DLog (GDPR) -.37 .23 -1.56 .11
CAR−1 -.03 .04 -.76 .45
C 18.68 5.33 3.50 .00
R-squared 0.83 Mean dep. var. 44.99
Adj. R-squared 0.81 S.D. dep. var. 44.46
S.E.of regression 21.12 D.B. stat. 1.01
Sum squared resid. 143218.2 F - stat. 42.29
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COMMENTS
With an enlarged sample containing also emerging European countries re-
sults change only slightly, while the effect of FDI on the lending interest rates
spread maintains the expected sign. New variables, like exports, increase the
ability of the specification to fit the data. All other variables included in the
previous test appear with the same sign as before, even though with differ-
ent degree of significance. This is the case of the CA balance (CAR) that is
losing grip, probably because it is crowded out by Exports.
As a partial conclusion, we can again state that the role of FDI in the
explanation of the sufferance signal (SPR) is still crucial, proving our theo-
retical supposition. The fact that this conclusion extends to some Eastern
Europe countries means that the importance of FDI to improve the sustain-
ability of ED obtains also in areas which are more integrated and financially
close to the EU.4
4The same analysis we are conducting for emerging countries cannot be carried out in
Euroland, since the SPR is quite compressed by the collateral policies of the ECB that
tends to equalize interest rates all across the Euro area (see Buiter and Sibert, 2005).
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4.3 TEST 3
Here we consider a different sample of countries grouped according to their
presumed similarity as far as the role of FDI in financing CA imbalances is
concerned. We keep the economies of the former group of Test 2 excluding
those belonging to the Middle East and to Asia.
The rationale lies in some macroeconomic affinities existing between Latin
America countries and Eastern Europe. These similarities concern the exter-
nal variables and the fact that Latin American countries have gone through a
transition, during the 1990s, from highly regulated and protected (sometimes
semi-autarkic) structures to quite open and flexible markets.
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Table 3
Method Pooled EGLS Fixed effects
Observations 252
Dep. var.: SPR
coefficient Std. error t-stat prob.
Expl. var.s
C 20.37 4.39 4.63 .00
INFL .21 .05 4.44 .00
NFDI / GDPN -.07 .03 -2.45 .01
GRMON .32 .06 4.81 .00
DLog(GDPR) -85.06 22.55 -3.77 .00
DLog (TOT) 1.39 8.28 .16 .87
CAR -.19 .24 -.77 .44
NFALC/GDPLC 4.20 11.97 .35 .73
R-squared 0.81 Mean dep var 50.02
Adj. R-squared 0.79 SD dep var 50.71
S.E.of regression 24.93 prob (F-stat) .00
Sum squared resid 136688.7
F-stat 30.76 DB stat 1.21
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COMMENTS
Here a new variable has been introduced, i.e. net financial assets over
GDP at current local prices. Changing the specification of the set of explana-
tory variables and using a more targeted sample with countries displaying,
supposedly, more homogeneous behavior does not eliminate the influence of
FDI as it appears from the coefficient which is still of the expected sign and
significative. In all cases FDI seems to reassure markets and have a positive
influence on the reduction of SPR.
As a partial conclusion it seems that the inclusion of fixed effects, the
changing specification and the changed sample may alter the importance of
FDI as an inverse determinant of SPR. Nonetheless the influence is always
significant and of the expected sign.
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5 Epilogue
The aim of this paper is to reassess the role of equity, proxied by FDI, on
the ED of a country. Equities appear in two sections of the FA of the BOP.
Equity inflows may finance the CA deficit of an economy as any other inflow
of financial assets. Unlike other financial assets, equity not contribute to
the ED of a country. This is what dictates the International code for the
compilation of external accounts. In the extreme case, a country can run CA
deficits for ever without worsening its ED, if it can sell a sufficient amount
of equity to foreigners.
This taxonomy rule is no fiction and comes from the very nature of equity
which represent pieces of an economy which are the property of nonresidents.
We add some flesh to this statement by showing theoretically and empir-
ically that markets actually regard equity, and its proxy FDI, as a special
“asset” which does not contain any definite obligation to pay back the holder.
Equity reduces the amount of resources that a country has to give to foreign-
ers through Trade Balance surpluses in order to reimburse an external debt.
The empirical proof of that comes from three tests conducted on panels
of emerging countries during the “hot” 1990s. In all tests FDI net inflows
reduce the spread (SPR) between the lending of US and that of the emerging
country examined. SPR is one of the mostly used indicator of distress of
the external position of a country and plays a crucial role as alarm clock
of country risk. Differences appear according to the sample of countries we
consider.
In the first sample where countries of Latina America and Asia are in-
cluded we see a strong effect of FDI on the reduction of SPR. Latin American
countries suffer a larger idiosyncratic SPR due to their weak financial system.
In this sense they reveal similarities with Eastern Europe countries (Test 3).
Both areas during the 1990s have gone through a transition process which
turned their economies from quite closed and regulated into financially open
countries increasingly integrated with the rest of the world.
As we have seen in the three tests, other variables affect SPR. Their
coefficients mostly behave in an orthodox manner. Nonetheless, none of
them is able to crowd out or reverse the expected effect of FDI on the SPR.
This is the first of two investigations we are carrying out on the effect of
CA and FA composition on the sustainability of external debt. The second
21
concerns geographic and industrial trade specialization and its effect on the
sustainability of an ED of an economy.
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